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Over the last quarter-century, the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms1 has proven to be fertile ground for litigation. Nowhere is this 
more true than in the context of police powers of search. In 1984, 
Hunter v. Southam2 taught us that section 8 of the Charter and the right 
to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure was an individual 
right grounded in privacy and not property interests. Hunter placed a 
protective Charter cloak over all reasonable expectations of privacy. We 
learned that in order to penetrate that cloak, state actors had first to 
obtain prior judicial authorization and that a failure to do so would result 
in a presumptively unreasonable search. Since Hunter, much judicial 
energy has been invested in developing a meaningful construct by which 
to locate the line between a reasonable and unreasonable expectation of 
privacy. As the years have passed and the courts have stamped creative 
investigative techniques with a privacy label, we have seen a corresponding 
proliferation of search provisions in the Criminal Code.3 While Parliament 
must be commended for attempting to keep stride with the evolution of 
section 8 Charter rulings, the ongoing dialogue between the courts and 
Parliament has resulted in nothing short of a complex labyrinth of Criminal 
Code provisions that have become virtually impossible to navigate and 
more difficult to apply. Police officers often find themselves spending 
more time debating which search provisions apply to their investigative 
techniques and the parameters of their constitutional requirements than 
involved in the investigation itself. Twenty-five years later, it is time to 
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1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
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Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”]. 
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pause, catch our breath, and think about how the administration of justice, 
the community at large and individual Charter interests can be best served 
going forward. 
II. IN THE BEGINNING THERE WAS SECTION 487 OF THE  
CRIMINAL CODE 
Section 487 of the Criminal Code4 is the most commonly resorted to 
provision by which to gain prior judicial authorization to search. It has 
existed since the beginning of time ― well, at least since the beginning 
of the Criminal Code.5 While it was amended periodically over the years, 
the core essence of section 487 has remained unchanged. In the beginning, 
it required that before a warrant issue, there exist reasonable grounds to 
believe that there were, in a named location, things that would “afford 
evidence as to the commission” of an offence.6 In its current formulation, 
section 487(1)(b) of the Code requires that there exist reasonable grounds 
to believe that an offence has been or is being committed and that there 
exists, in a specific location, “anything” that “will afford evidence with 
respect to the commission of an offence”.7 Assuming these criteria are 
met, a warrant may issue permitting the search of a “building, receptacle 
or place for any such thing and to seize it”.8 
Life was simple back in 1892 when what is now section 487 was 
first enacted and stood as the beacon for prior judicial authorization. 
After all, there was no need for anything more. The expression “search 
and seizure” had an obvious meaning back in pre-Charter days. It meant 
looking for, locating and taking away tangible items. Before the turn of 
the 20th century and, indeed, well into it, no one would have imagined 
that a request for mere information would constitute a “search” or  
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 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
5
 Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c. 29. 
6
 Section 569 of the Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c. 29. It has been amended over the years by: 
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seizure of a thing where there are reasonable grounds to believe it will “reveal the whereabouts of a 
person who is believed to have committed an offence ...”.  
8
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“seizure”.9 The term “biographical core of personal information” had 
not been coined.10 Computers had not been invented and so non-tangible 
electronic data did not challenge the outside parameters of the precursor 
to section 487. Tracking devices, digital number recorders, and pinhole 
video cameras were not even the things of science fiction novels, let 
alone part of the investigator’s tool kit. Who would have known that 
individuals held a genetic fingerprint in their bodily substances and  
how critically important that genetic fingerprint would become to the 
administration of justice?11 Come to think of it, fingerprints were not 
even introduced into the Canadian law enforcement world until the 20th 
century. Yes, life was simple back then. It has taken a turn. 
III. SECTION 8 OF THE CHARTER AND THE AGE OF  
INVESTIGATIVE INNOVATION 
After the Charter’s proclamation in 1982, it did not take long for 
section 8 to achieve a special and sustained spotlight in the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The Court quickly set to work on providing meaningful 
content to the 12 simple words: “Everyone has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search and seizure.” In its 1984 Hunter v. Southam12 
debut, Dickson J., as he then was, decided that, barring some compelling 
reason, section 8 protected reasonable expectations of privacy from the 
state’s prying eyes. As the years passed, the court provided necessary 
guidance on how to identify section 8 privacy protected interests. To 
name but a few, cases like R. v. Edwards, R. v. Duarte and R. v. Tessling 
represent valiant attempts by the Court to provide a lens through which 
to determine whether a Charter protected privacy interest exists.13 While 
our understanding of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of 
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 R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203 (S.C.C.). 
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 This expression is taken from R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203,  
at 212-13 (S.C.C.), per Sopinka J.  
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 The introduction of forensic DNA to the criminal justice system has served to identify 
both the innocent and the guilty. Names like David Milgaard, Guy Paul Morin and Thomas 
Sophonow resonate as examples of those who have been fully exonerated as a result of forensic 
DNA. See: R. v. B. (S.A.), [2003] S.C.J. No. 61, 178 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at para. 51 (S.C.C.) per 
Arbour J.; R. v. Briggs, [2001] O.J. No. 3339, 157 C.C.C. (3d) 38, at paras. 22-23 (Ont. C.A.)  
per Weiler J.A., leave to appeal refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 31 (S.C.C.). 
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 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
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 R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136 (S.C.C.); R. v. Duarte, [1990] 
S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 129 
(S.C.C.).  
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privacy and how to arrive at that determination has evolved over the 
years, there is bound to be further clarification of this important concept 
in the years to come.14 
For now, while peering through the privacy lens, we know that the 
courts have arrived at a liberal construction for privacy which goes well 
beyond what was historically considered protected. The birth of Charter 
protected informational privacy in R. v. Plant, in 1993, left no doubt 
about the fact that the Supreme Court was willing to stretch the limit 
beyond our traditional understanding of privacy. In what has become an 
oft-quoted passage, Sopinka J. observed: 
... In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, 
it is fitting that s. 8 of the Charter should seek to protect a biographical 
core of personal information which individuals in a free and democratic 
society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the 
state. This would include information which tends to reveal intimate 
details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual.15 
Today, this “liberal approach to the protection of privacy” is firmly 
embedded in section 8 jurisprudence.16 
It did not take long to realize that the Criminal Code17 was ill equipped 
to accommodate this expansive approach to privacy. Given the Hunter v. 
Southam18 conclusion that searches impressing themselves on reasonable 
expectations of privacy would be presumptively unreasonable, barring 
prior judicial authorization, suddenly section 487 was not enough.19 This 
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 Distilled, the current approach takes into account the totality of the circumstances, 
including consideration of any subjective expectation of privacy held by the individual asserting the 
privacy interest and the objective reasonableness of that expectation. (See R. v. Edwards, [1996] 
S.C.J. No. 11, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136, at 150-51 (S.C.C.), per Cory J.) We are very likely to benefit 
from the Court’s expanded views on this issue in two cases currently under reserve in the Supreme 
Court of Canada: R. v. M. (A.), [2006] S.C.J. No. 1663, 208 C.C.C. (3d) 438 (Ont. C.A.), leave to 
appeal granted [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 229 (S.C.C.); R. v. Brown, [2006] A.J. No. 755, 210 C.C.C. 
(3d) 317 (Alta. C.A.), motion to extend time granted [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 323 (S.C.C.).  
15
 R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203, at 212-13 (S.C.C.), per Sopinka J.  
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 R. v. Law, [2002] S.C.J. No. 10, 160 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at paras. 15-16 (S.C.C.), per 
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 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
19
 There are, of course, some warrantless searches that can overtake the presumption of 
unreasonableness, including: abandonment (R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Law, [2002] S.C.J. No. 10, 160 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.)); consent (R. v. Borden, 
[1994] S.C.J. No. 82, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 404 (S.C.C.)); exigent circumstances (R. v. Grant, [1993] 
S.C.J. No. 98, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 173 (S.C.C.)); search incident to arrest (R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 
185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.); R. v. Caslake, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, 121 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.)); and 
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raised the question, what would be enough? Judicial authorization, but 
informed by what? According to Dickson J. in Hunter, the answer to 
that question lay in the context of the search. What might be enough in 
one context, might not be in another. He put it this way: 
... Section 443 [now section 487] of the Criminal Code authorizes a 
warrant only where there has been information upon oath that there is 
“reasonable ground to believe” that there is evidence of an offence in 
the place to be searched. ... The state’s interest in detecting and preventing 
crime begins to prevail over the individual’s interest in being left alone 
at the point where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion. History 
has confirmed the appropriateness of this requirement as the threshold 
for subordinating the expectation of privacy to the needs of law 
enforcement. Where in the state’s interest is not simply law enforcement 
as, for instance, where state security is involved, or where the individual’s 
interest is not simply his expectation of privacy, as for instance, when 
the search threatens his bodily integrity, the relevant standard might 
well be a different one. ...20 
So it was, with these words, that the contextual approach to prior 
judicial authorization was born. It was restated by Wilson J. a few years 
later in R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd. as follows:  
Since individuals have different expectations of privacy in different 
contexts and with regard to different kinds of information and documents, 
it follows that the standard of review of what is ‘reasonable’ in a given 
context must be flexible if it is to be realistic and meaningful.21 
Sometimes, reasonable grounds to believe certain facts would 
suffice to get a warrant. When that threshold test met constitutional 
standards, the state’s interest would prevail over the individual’s privacy 
interest when “credibly based probability” replaced suspicion. But, this 
threshold test would not always be required. Other contexts may permit 
the constitutionalization of a suspicion standard. Yet others may require 
more than simple belief. Time would tell. 
As the common law has evolved in the post-Charter era, and the 
courts have found section 8 privacy interests adversely impacted by a 
constellation of investigative techniques and police powers, the need to 
provide the jurisdiction for prior authorization has become a not-infrequent 
                                                                                                            
search incident to investigative detention (R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 
(S.C.C.)). 
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 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 114-15 (S.C.C.). 
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 R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] S.C.J. No. 25, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 530, at 542-43 (S.C.C.). 
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challenge for Parliament. In an effort to either pre-empt or quickly respond 
to section 8 decisions, Parliament has taken a contextual approach to 
setting out the requirements for such authorization. This has led to a 
remarkable proliferation of search provisions in the Criminal Code.22 As 
noted by Rosenberg J.A. in R. v. Backhouse: 
Since proclamation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms there has 
been an explosion of legislative activity in the field of search and 
seizure. In Hunter v. Southam, [cite omitted] the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that warrantless searches for purposes of criminal 
investigation are presumptively unreasonable and in R. v. Collins the 
Court held that for a search to be reasonable it must be authorized by 
law. In the result, Parliament has moved quickly to fill in gaps in the 
legislative scheme of search and seizure to provide the police with the 
necessary tools to investigate crime while ensuring that the public and 
individual interests in privacy are adequately protected.23 
Unfortunately, the different search provisions are sometimes 
inconsistent and difficult to reconcile. What follows is a discussion of 
specific examples of section 8 Charter dialogue between the courts and 
Parliament and how that dialogue has been, in part, responsible for the 
maze of search provisions we have today. It is followed by some, 
hopefully, practical observations about how Parliament might start to 
rejig these provisions in a manner that, while staying true to section 8 
interests, brings clarity and some level of simplicity to the Criminal 
Code.24 
IV. FIRST THERE WAS R. V. DUARTE AND THEN THERE WERE 
PARTICIPANT SURVEILLANCE AUTHORIZATIONS 
Prior to R. v. Duarte,25 while Part VI of the Criminal Code26 allowed 
for judicial authorization for electronic surveillance of third parties, 
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 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. I am not the first person to have written on this subject and trust I 
will not be the last. For an earlier excellent discussion of the confusion that reigns in the many 
search provisions in the Criminal Code, with a particular focus on ss. 487 and 487.01 warrants, and 
a “modest” proposal for change, see Renee Pomerance, “Criminal Code Search Warrants: A Plea 
for a New Generic Warrant” in Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law, Don Stuart, R.J. Delisle & 
Allan Manson, eds. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell 1999). See also Kent Roach’s illuminating discussion in 
“Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures” 
(2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481. 
23
 [2005] O.J. No. 754, 194 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 110 (Ont. C.A.). 
24
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
25
 [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
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there was no Code provision allowing for an authorization to permit 
intercepts of conversations where there was a consenting party.27 There 
was a strong basis upon which to suggest that section 8 did not apply as, 
some thought, a person could not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a conversation that he or she had with another person. After 
all, the recipient of those words could simply repeat them at will. The 
intercept would be nothing more than an accurate recording of those 
words and, ergo, allow for an accurate recounting of the conversation.28 
As noted by Cory J.A., as he then was, in the court below, “the admission 
of electronic recordings of those conversations would seem to be a 
reasonable, logical and sequential step in trial proceedings.” Indeed, he 
made the practical observation that an “accurate transcript of the 
conversation should so often benefit the accused as the informant”.29 
The Court of Appeal was in good company in arriving at this 
conclusion. It had on its side the United States Supreme Court. In Lopez 
v. United States the following words were used to describe participant 
surveillance: 
Stripped to its essentials, petitioner’s argument amounts to saying that 
he has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the agent’s 
memory, or to challenge the agent’s credibility without being beset by 
corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of impeachment. For no 
other argument can justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation 
that the agent could testify to from memory.30 
This position was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada. In his 
oft-quoted passage, La Forest J. emphasized the highly intrusive nature 
of all electronic surveillance, regardless of who may be consenting to its 
interception: 
The very efficacy of electronic surveillance is such that it has the 
potential, if left unregulated, to annihilate any expectation that our 
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 Then Part IV.1 of the Criminal Code. 
27
 This type of technique is often referred to as “consent” or “participant” surveillance. 
Typically, an undercover police officer or state agent will be a party to a communication which he 
or she consents to being electronically captured.  
28
 This is most likely the rationale behind exempting a consenting person (including a state 
actor) from the offence provision within s. 184(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
Section 184(2)(a) ensures that a consenting party to a communication (either the originator or the 
recipient of the communication) may wilfully intercept that communication without committing an 
offence. See R. v. Goldman, [1979] S.C.J. No. 136, 13 C.R. (3d) 228 (S.C.C.). 
29
 R. v. Duarte, [1987] O.J. No. 821, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 10 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1990] S.C.J. 
No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.). 
30
 373 U.S. 427, at 438-39 (1963). 
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communications will remain private. A society which exposed us, at 
the whim of the state, to the risk of having a permanent electronic 
recording made of our words every time we opened our mouths might 
be superbly equipped to fight crime, but would be one in which 
privacy no longer had any meaning. As Douglas J., dissenting in 
United States v. White, supra, put it, at p. 756: “Electronic surveillance 
is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known.” If the state may 
arbitrarily record and transmit our private communications, it is no 
longer possible to strike an appropriate balance between the right of 
the individual to be left alone and the right of the state to intrude on 
privacy in the furtherance of its goals, notably the need to investigate 
and combat crime.31 
With this approach to electronic surveillance, it is not surprising that 
La Forest J., for the Court, recognized that while the Charter cannot 
protect people from their friends repeating their words, it must protect 
them from permanent recordings of their conversations with their 
“friends”.32 Individuals must be protected, not from the state repeating 
their words, but from the “much more insidious danger inherent in 
allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our 
words”.33 In the end, La Forest J. concluded that it would be “unacceptable 
in a free society that the agencies of the state be free to use this technology 
at their sole discretion” as it would pose a “wholly unacceptable” threat 
to privacy.34 
Parliament responded to the call for prior judicial authorization with 
section 184.2 of the Criminal Code.35 This became the means by which 
to gain authorization to intercept communications where at least one 
party to the communication was consenting to its capture. Parliament 
approached the legislative exercise by taking into account the specific 
privacy interests at play. In doing so, despite the strong dicta from R. v. 
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 R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 11 (S.C.C.). It is not without some 
irony that La Forest J. places emphasis on the passage from United States v. White, 201 U.S. 745 
(1971) to demonstrate the highly intrusive nature of electronic surveillance when, in fact, in the 
United States, there is no prior authorization needed to capture a communication where at least one 
party consents to its capture. 
32
 R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 11 (S.C.C.). 
33
 R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 11 (S.C.C.). 
34
 R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 13-14 (S.C.C.). 
35
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 4. At the same time that s. 184.2 was 
proclaimed in force, so were officer lifelines and emergency wires: ss. 184.1 and 184.4 of the Code 
respectively. In brief compass, these provisions specifically allow for non-judicially authorized 
electronic surveillance in situations where serious bodily harm may result to a consenting party, 
usually a police officer or police agent, or to a victim of crime, and there is insufficient time to 
obtain a judicial authorization.  
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) REASONABLE APPROACH 63 
Duarte,36 one would be forgiven for thinking that Parliament was 
somewhat swayed by what it considered to be a diminished expectation 
of privacy for the person caught speaking to the consenting party. As 
such, while it responded to the Duarte call for legislation to permit prior 
authorization, Parliament chose to deal with participant surveillance 
differently than a full blown third party authorization to intercept private 
communications where there is no consenting party. The fluctuating 
privacy interest has led to dramatically different application and 
authorization requirements. 
The requirements for third party authorizations are governed by 
sections 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code37 and it is beyond the scope 
of this paper to study them in full. Suffice it to say that the statutory 
criteria surrounding the application and issuance process for a third 
party authorization contains the most robust requirements within the 
Criminal Code. A third party application requires that the applicant, a 
specially designated agent of the Attorney General or Minister of Public 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness, bring the application before a 
superior court judge, accompanied by an affidavit setting out a peace 
officer’s grounds to believe a number of factors enumerated in section 
185(c)-(h). An application may only be brought in respect of an offence 
designated for such a purpose in section 183 of the Code. The authorization 
may issue where the judge is satisfied that “it would be in the best  
interests of the administration of justice to do so” (see s. 186(1)(a)) and 
where it meets the requirements of investigative necessity. Interestingly, 
section 186 of the Code is missing a threshold test for the issuance of 
the authorization. Unlike most other search provisions in the Code that 
require the issuing justice to be satisfied on reasonable grounds of some 
nature, section 186 only speaks in terms of the judge being satisfied that 
the “best interests of the administration of justice” would be served by 
allowing the authorization. In R. v. Finlay Martin J.A. interpreted these 
words to be mutually inclusive, in this context, with a reasonable grounds 
to believe standard: 
... Thus, it appears to me that the prerequisite that the judge must be 
satisfied that it would be in the best interests of the administration of 
justice to grant the authorization, the context of the legislative scheme, 
imports as a minimum requirement that the authorizing judge must be 
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a particular 
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 [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
37
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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offence or a conspiracy, attempt or incitement to commit it has been, 
or is being, committed.38 
In terms of the investigative necessity requirement, section 186(1)(b) 
of the Code requires that the applicant establish that “other investigative 
procedures have been tried and have failed, other investigative procedures 
are unlikely to succeed or the urgency of the matter is such that it would 
be impractical to carry out the investigation of the offence using only 
other investigative procedures”. In R. v. Araujo LeBel J. held that 
“investigative necessity” means that “[t]here must be, practically speaking, 
no other reasonable alternative method of investigation, in the circumstances 
of the particular criminal inquiry.”39 
By way of contrast, the post-Duarte40 requirements for an authorization 
permitting participant surveillance rest on simple reasonable grounds to 
believe that any Criminal Code41 or federal offence has been or will be 
committed, that there is a consenting party to the interception of the 
communication and that “information” concerning the offence will be 
obtained through the interception. The application can be made by a 
peace or public officer to a provincial court judge. Importantly, there is 
no requirement for investigative necessity. 
In its response to R. v. Duarte,42 Parliament gave officers section 184.2 
to permit participant surveillance to continue with proper authorization. 
Clearly, they did not feel that this type of authorization was as pressing 
on privacy interests as a full-blown third party authorization. In the end, 
while Parliament required that participant surveillance comply with a 
Hunter v. Southam43 reasonable grounds to believe threshold, it evidently 
revealed its perception of the different constitutional context for this 
type of interference with privacy. It did this by eliminating investigative 
necessity and Crown agents from the formula, as well as permitting an 
authorization to be issued by a provincial court judge for any Criminal 
Code44 or federal offence that had been or might be committed in the 
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 [1985] O.J. No. 2680, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 48, at 70-71 (Ont. C.A.), per Martin J.A., leave to 
appeal refused [1986] 1 S.C.R. ix (S.C.C.). 
39
 [2000] S.C.J. No. 65, 149 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 29 (S.C.C.), per LeBel J.  
40
 R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
41
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
42
 [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
43
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
44
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) REASONABLE APPROACH 65 
future.45 These are fundamentally different legislative provisions, informed 
by, what Parliament perceived to be, fundamentally different constitutional 
standards. 
V. FIRST THERE WAS R. V. WONG AND THEN THERE WERE  
VIDEO-WARRANTS 
Mr. Wong was engaged in illegal gambling in a hotel room. With 
the permission of the hotel, the police installed video equipment in the 
room and, on a number of occasions, monitored it from the adjacent 
room. They did this without prior authorization. After all, there was 
none to be had. Close on the heels of R. v. Duarte,46 La Forest J., on behalf 
of the majority, concluded that the unauthorized video-surveillance used 
in R. v. Wong47 constituted a section 8 Charter breach. He did not mince 
words in setting out his vision of the Orwellian world we would live in 
if state actors could decide, on their own, when to videotape the activities 
of citizens: 
I am firmly of the view that if a free and open society cannot brook the 
prospect that the agents of the state should, in the absence of judicial 
authorization, enjoy the right to record the words of whomever they 
choose, it is equally inconceivable that the state should have 
unrestricted discretion to target whomever it wishes for surreptitious 
video surveillance. George Orwell in his classic dystopian novel, 1984, 
paints a grim picture of a society whose citizens had every reason to 
expect that their every movement was subject to electronic video 
surveillance. The contrast with the expectations of privacy in a free 
society such as our own could not be more striking. The notion that the 
agencies of the state should be at liberty to train hidden cameras on 
members of society wherever and whenever they wish is fundamentally 
irreconcilable with what we perceive to be acceptable behaviour on the 
part of government. ... we must always be alert to the fact that modern 
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methods of electronic surveillance have the potential, if uncontrolled, 
to annihilate privacy.48 
This passage has far-reaching effects. At first glance, it leaves the 
impression that La Forest J. was of the view that, like R. v. Duarte,49 
prior authorization was required any time the state wished to electronically 
record the citizen. He later qualified his comments by suggesting that 
the question for consideration was whether “in a society such as ours 
persons who retire to a hotel room and close the door behind them have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy”.50 Unlike Duarte, then, La Forest J. 
was prepared to accept that the police were only precluded from capturing 
individuals on videotape where they were involved in activity in an 
environment where they had a reasonable expectation of privacy. In the 
end, he concluded that Mr. Wong had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the hotel room set up for the gambling activity.51 In observing 
that no legislative mechanism existed for video-surveillance authorizations, 
La Forest J. commented on the role of the legislature: it is for 
“Parliament, and Parliament alone, to set out the conditions under which 
law enforcement agencies may employ video surveillance technology”.52 
Parliament did not take long to respond. They chose a questionable 
manner in which to do so. The general warrant was proclaimed in force 
shortly after R. v. Wong.53 The general warrant provision, section 487.01, 
located in Part XV of the Criminal Code54 (where most of the search 
provisions are located) allows a judge of the provincial or superior court 
to issue a warrant permitting an officer to “use any device or investigative 
technique or procedure or do any thing described in the warrant that 
would, if not authorized, constitute an unreasonable search or seizure in 
respect of a person or a person’s property”. This provision filled a void 
left by section 487 of the Code, permitting officers to engage in 
investigative activity touching on section 8 privacy interests, but not 
involving a search for tangible items. Bearing in mind that section 487 
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of the Code only permitted the seizure of a “thing”,55 with the emphasis 
on prior judicial authorization in the post-Charter era, there was a clear 
need for the general warrant to accommodate those investigative activities 
that involved an intersection with privacy interests but did not result in 
officers walking away with tangible seizures. 
Interestingly, what has been dubbed the “general warrant” in section 
487.01, requires that the “best interests of the administration of justice” 
be met before the warrant issue. No such requirement exists in section 
487 of the Code.56 Presumably, this was an effort by Parliament to 
recognize a broader invasion of privacy that could be triggered by the 
use of one of these warrants. What is curious is that it is not entirely 
clear what the “best interests” requirement means in the context of the 
general warrant. We know from R. v. Finlay,57 that the requirement in 
section 186(1)(a) of the Code means reasonable grounds to believe that 
an offence has been or is being committed, and that the use of the 
investigative technique will assist in advancing the investigation. But, 
section 487.01(1)(a), the general warrant provision, already articulates a 
reasonable grounds to believe threshold test. A provincial or superior 
court judge (not justice of the peace) must have reasonable grounds to 
believe that an offence against the Criminal Code58 or any other Act of 
Parliament “has been or will be committed”. In Finlay, Martin J.A. went 
on to suggest that the “best interests of the administration of justice” test 
in section 186(1)(a), beyond incorporating a reasonable grounds standard, 
also required a delicate balance to be achieved between competing interests. 
As he noted: 
... Although the term “in the best interests of the administration of 
justice” is incapable of precise definition it imports, in my view, in the 
context, two readily identifiable and mutually supportive components. 
The first component is that the judge must be satisfied that the granting 
of the authorization will further or advance the objectives of justice. 
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The second component imports a balancing of the interests of law 
enforcement and the individual’s interest in privacy.59 
As noted by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Bernardo, the phrase, “interests  
of justice” is found throughout the Code and simply suggests judicial 
discretion to be exercised on a case-by-case basis, balancing societal and 
individual interests.60 These comments, and those of Martin J.A. in R. v. 
Finlay,61 have a distinct section 8 ring to them. They suggest that the 
phrase requires a judicial officer to engage in a final balancing of 
individual and state interests before issuing process. These words, then, 
dovetail with section 8 requirements. As noted by Cory J. in Quebec 
(Attorney General) v. C.B.C.,62 once statutory conditions for issuing a 
warrant are met, the issuing justice or judge must still determine whether 
to exercise his or her discretion in favour of issuing the authorization. 
This discretion can only be exercised after taking into account a final 
delicate balance between the competing interests of the state and the 
individual’s right to privacy.63 These comments were made in the 
context of a section 487 warrant that does not include the subject phrase. 
In other words, section 8 always requires the balance adverted to by 
reference to the “best interests” of justice language. In light of this fact, 
despite its inclusion in section 487.01 (and some other search provisions), 
query its necessity? Perhaps it is just a friendly reminder to the justice, 
in some search provisions, to engage in the final constitutionally required 
balance. 
Parliament chose the general warrant as the vehicle within which to 
absorb the need to provide for judicial authorization for video-warrants. 
Section 487.01(4) and (5) is the legislative response to R. v. Wong.64 It 
provides for a warrant that allows a peace officer to observe a person by 
means of a video camera where he or she is “engaged in activity in 
circumstances in which the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy”. 
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The provision requires that the judge “shall” place such terms and 
conditions on the warrant as is considered advisable to “ensure the 
privacy of the person or of any other person” as much as possible.65 
Despite its decision to place the R. v. Wong66 video amendment in 
Part XV of the Criminal Code,67 Parliament heeded La Forest J.’s 
approach to video surveillance and approached it like other forms of 
electronic surveillance cared for in Part VI of the Code. As such, 
particular note must be made of section 487.01(5), incorporating by 
reference, aspects of Part VI of the Criminal Code. Among others, 
section 487.01(5) incorporates sections 183, 184.2, 185 and 186 of the 
Criminal Code with such “modifications as required”. This means that 
all of the safeguards applicable to electronic surveillance, built into Part 
VI of the Code, are applicable to video-warrants. For instance, where 
there is a consenting party for the video capture, the s. 184.2 requirements 
apply. Note, though, that the warrant issues under section 487.01 of  
the Code, meaning that, unlike other forms of electronic participant 
surveillance in Part VI, a “best interests of the administration of justice” 
criterion applies to video participant surveillance. Because consent 
video-warrants are governed by the requirements of section 184.2, a 
police officer may bring the application. 
Where there is no consenting party, the video-warrant is subject to 
the same strenuous requirements of a third party authorization reviewed 
above. Again, the warrant issues under section 487.01. This causes some 
uncomfortable inconsistency between provisions. For instance, section 
487.01(1) allows a general warrant to issue where there are sufficient 
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence “has been or will be 
committed”. As noted in the passage from R. v. Finlay68 set out above, 
the “best interests of the administration of justice” criterion within 
section 186(1)(a) has been judicially interpreted to mean reasonable 
grounds to believe that “a particular offence or a conspiracy, attempt or 
incitement to commit it has been, or is being, committed”. There is no 
ability to access a section 186(1)(a) authorization for an anticipated offence. 
It is difficult to reconcile this inconsistency between the provisions, or 
to know what is available. As well, how do the “best interests of the 
administration of justice” components within sections 186(1)(a) and 
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487.01(1)(b) differ? Do they mean different things in these different 
contexts? How does a judge exercise his or her discretion properly? 
Moreover, based on the application of sections 185 and 186, a designated 
agent must be the applicant and only a superior court judge can issue a 
video-warrant. This is in contradistinction to section 487.01 warrants 
which can be applied for by peace officers and issued by either provincial 
or superior court judges. Confusion often attends on these applications. 
That confusion arises out of the legislative means chosen by Parliament 
to respond to the Court’s comments in R. v. Wong.69 
VI. FIRST THERE WAS R. V. FEGAN AND THEN THERE WERE 
DIGITAL NUMBER RECORDERS 
The issue in R. v. Fegan70 was whether it constituted an unreasonable 
search and seizure, within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter, when 
Bell Canada attached a digital number recorder (“DNR”) to Mr. Fegan’s 
home telephone, to record numbers dialled to and from that telephone, 
in an effort to determine whether he was responsible for making certain 
calls.71 Justice Finlayson concluded that, in the circumstances of the case, 
there was no state actor involved in the application of the DNR and, 
therefore, the Charter did not apply. However, the clear implication of 
the judgment was that state actors engaging in similar conduct would be 
held to account under section 8. In other words, individuals have a privacy 
interest in the numbers dialled to and from their phones. 
Close on the heels of R. v. Fegan72 came section 492.2 of the 
Criminal Code.73 Interestingly, this provision, unlike search provisions 
in the Criminal Code that predated it, only required that the issuing 
“justice” have reasonable grounds to “suspect that an offence ... has 
been or will be committed and that information that would assist in the 
investigation of the offence could be obtained through the use of a 
number recorder”.74 Where these circumstances prevail, a justice may 
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issue a DNR for up to 60 days. This was Parliament’s first clear and 
intentional shift away from the Hunter v. Southam75 reasonable grounds 
to believe threshold in the criminal context. 
In R. v. Monney,76 Iacobucci J. commented on the suspicion threshold 
used and found to be constitutionally acceptable in the Customs Act77 
context: 
Dickson C.J. also referred to the caveat expressed in the reasons in 
Hunter that the reasonableness of a search must be assessed in context. 
The relevant qualification of the reasonableness standard as stated in 
Hunter is that the standard of reasonableness is subject to change 
“[w]here the state’s interest is not simply law enforcement as, for 
instance, where state security is involved, or where the individual’s 
interest is not simply [an] expectation of privacy as, for instance, when 
the search threatens ... bodily integrity” (p. 168) Adopting a contextual 
approach to the assessment of reasonableness for the purposes of s. 8, 
the Court concluded in Simmons that the degree of personal privacy 
reasonably expected at border crossings is lower than would otherwise 
be available in a wholly domestic setting.78 
DNR’s are used in a “wholly domestic setting” and for criminal 
investigations. Yet Parliament chose to use this standard in section 
492.2 of the Code. While the suspicion threshold is incapable of exact 
definition, it is, undoubtedly, an easier standard to achieve than reasonable 
grounds to believe. As noted in R. v. Monney, reasonable grounds to 
suspect “can be viewed as a lesser but included standard in the threshold of 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe”.79 
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The particular legislative construct chosen for section 492.2 was 
Parliament’s way of recognizing the need for judicial authorization to 
allow for the installation of a DNR, while at the same time reflecting the 
diminished expectation of privacy in number recorder data. In other 
words, while an individual has a privacy interest in this data, the suspicion 
threshold was perhaps a reflection of Parliament’s less than convinced 
attitude that it was a strong privacy interest deserving of a full Hunter v. 
Southam80 standard. 
Parliament may have been wrong on this, yet only time will tell.  
So far, the suspicion threshold has been successfully challenged as 
constitutionally insufficient in R. v. Nguyen.81 Justice Halfyard concluded 
that the Hunter v. Southam82 standard must always apply in criminal 
investigations. Relying on a comment of La Forest J. in Thomson 
Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, “when the state seeks information ... in the 
course of a criminal investigation ... the citizen has a very high expectation 
of privacy in respect of such investigation”, Halfyard J. concluded that 
the “Hunter standards must apply” to DNRs.83 
In an opposite result, the Quebec Superior Court has upheld the 
provision as constitutionally sufficient in R. v. Whitman-Langille.84 In 
this case, Cohen J. concluded that she saw “nothing in the Hunter 
decision nor in the other jurisprudence ... that would require the same 
standard of belief in the case of number recorder warrants as is required 
for wiretaps”.85 She based her conclusion on both the early stage of the 
investigation when DNRs are typically used and the skeletal data available 
with the use of this investigative tool.86 This decision was upheld on appeal. 
Justice Hilton emphasized the contextual approach to section 8 and held: 
... It is an exaggeration to assimilate the information of a telephone 
number and the duration that a telephone is off the hook with anything 
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that can reasonably be considered so “private” so as to require the 
highest standard of protection of section 8 of the Canadian Charter, 
especially when the information does not indicate which person is 
using the telephone, whether there was a conversation, and if so, with 
whom the conversation is taking place, as well as its details.87 
What is interesting about the suspicion threshold contained within 
section 492.2, is that it stands in stark contrast with section 487 of the Code. 
It leaves a situation where, if officers wish to obtain historical phone 
records, they must obtain a section 487 search warrant, informed by 
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been or is being 
committed. But, if the same officer wishes to obtain future phone records, 
on a go-forward basis, he or she must only demonstrate reasonable 
suspicion that an offence has been, is being, or will be committed. One 
might reasonably suggest that these fluctuating standards not only inject 
a sense of confusion, but are difficult to reconcile from a constitutional 
perspective. 
In addition, in its haste to legislate, Parliament only provided a “justice” 
with jurisdiction to authorize a DNR. “Justice” is defined in section 2 of 
the Code as a justice of the peace or a provincial court judge. Absent 
provincial legislation, superior court judges have no jurisdiction to issue 
this type of warrant. This creates substantial problems where rolled-up 
applications are required to be brought before a superior court judge. 
For instance, where an officer is seeking a DNR to complement a wiretap 
authorization, in some provinces, superior court judges cannot make 
both orders.88 It appears that, in its possible exuberance to demonstrate 
its view of the minimal privacy interest engaged by DNR information, 
thereby leaving this type of prior authorization to lower courts, Parliament 
may have created some unintentional jurisdictional hurdles. 
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VII. FIRST THERE WAS R. V. WISE AND THEN THERE WERE 
TRACKING WARRANTS 
In R. v. Wise,89 the Court was invited to accept a Crown concession 
that the installation of a tracking device inside a vehicle constituted an 
unreasonable search within the meaning of section 8, as there was no 
prior judicial authorization. In accepting this concession, Cory J., for 
the majority, concluded that while the installation and monitoring of the 
tracking device invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy, it was only 
minimally intrusive. This finding was, in part, based on Cory J.’s 
observation that the tracking device in question was highly rudimentary 
and was installed in a motor vehicle, where there is a significantly reduced 
reasonable expectation of privacy.90 Justice Cory gave legislative direction 
in the following comments: 
I agree with my colleague that it would be preferable if the installation 
of tracking devices and the subsequent monitoring of vehicles were 
controlled by legislation. I would also agree that this is a less intrusive 
means of surveillance than electronic audio or video surveillance. 
Accordingly, a lower standard such as a “solid ground” for suspicion 
would be a basis for obtaining an authorization from an independent 
authority, such as a justice of the peace, to install a device and monitor 
the movements of a vehicle.91 
On the heels of R. v. Wise92 came section 492.1 of the Criminal 
Code.93 As with the DNR warrant provision, Parliament decided to 
attach a minimal threshold of reasonable grounds to suspect. Section 
492.1 permits a tracking warrant to issue where there exist reasonable 
grounds to suspect that an offence has been or will be committed, and 
that “information that is relevant to the commission of the offence, 
including the whereabouts of any person, can be obtained through the 
use of a tracking device”. Where the justice is satisfied that these 
circumstances exist, he or she can authorize the installation, maintenance 
and removal of a tracking device “in or on any thing, including a thing 
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carried, used or worn by any person”.94 Like the DNR, only a justice 
may issue this type of authorization for up to 60 days. 
Based on the comments of Cory J. in R. v. Wise,95 Parliament clearly 
felt comfortable setting out a suspicion threshold. Query whether  
the constitutional threshold should fluctuate depending on where the 
installation is being made? What about the motor vehicle that has to be 
removed from private property to effect the installation? What about 
where the tracking device is actually installed in something “worn” or 
“carried” by the person being tracked? Once the installation is complete 
and the state is truly “tracking” the whereabouts of the person, the 
privacy interest is arguably attenuated. The live constitutional question 
surrounds what must take place in order to get to the stage where the 
state can effectively track the individual. It is somewhat ironic that 
police officers may only get authorization to enter a car to conduct a 
search under section 487 of the Code, on the basis of reasonable 
grounds to believe, yet may enter the same vehicle to install a tracking 
device on the basis of reasonable grounds to suspect. 
Moreover, a general warrant under section 487.01 of the Code to 
enter a motor vehicle to engage in an investigative technique, may only 
be issued by a provincial or superior court judge. Yet a justice of the 
peace may authorize entry to install a tracking device (section 492.1). 
As well, while a justice of the peace may order entry into a private place 
under section 487 to permit the seizure of a tangible item, the item to be 
seized may only relate to an offence that has been or is being committed. 
Yet, the same justice may authorize entry into the same private place to 
surreptitiously install a tracking device for an offence that may occur in 
the future. 
These legislative inconsistencies arise out of the R. v. Wise96 decision. 
While Parliament was entitled to act on the comments of the Court in 
Wise, lowering the threshold requirements for a judicial authorization,  
it has resulted in a good deal of confusion. 
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VIII. FIRST THERE WAS R. V. BORDEN AND THEN THERE WERE 
DNA WARRANTS 
In R. v. Borden,97 the Supreme Court was asked to assess the 
constitutionality of a “consent” seizure of bodily substances taken from 
a suspect in an investigation. The consent was found to be constitutionally 
lacking as Mr. Borden was not informed of all the purposes the state had 
in mind for his DNA sample. (At the time it was taken, the officers 
knew that they would use the bodily sample to compare Mr. Borden’s DNA 
in relation to a crime and crime scene sample he was not apprised of.)98 
As a result, the taking of his bodily substance, without lawful consent, 
constituted a section 8 Charter breach. As noted by Iacobucci J.: “the 
respondent had an expectation of privacy with respect to his bodily 
integrity and the informational content of his blood.”99 
DNA “information” was much too valuable to leave without a 
proper legislative tool to permit seizure. What resulted in the wake of  
R. v. Borden100 was an intricate legislative scheme, carefully crafted to 
permit the seizure of bodily substances directly from the body, while at 
the same time attending to and caring for the heightened privacy interest 
engaged. Sections 487.04-09 represented Parliament’s attempt to set up 
a scheme that set out the constitutional requirements that must be met 
before a DNA warrant issues and the procedures that must attend the 
execution of the warrant.101 
In brief compass, a provincial court judge may issue a DNA warrant 
when satisfied, pursuant to section 487.05(1), that there exist reasonable 
grounds to believe that an offence designated in section 487.04 has been 
committed, that a bodily substance related to the commission of the 
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offence has been found,102 that the person from whom the DNA sample 
is sought was “a party to the offence” and that forensic DNA analysis of 
the person’s bodily substance will provide “evidence” about whether the 
crime scene sample was from that person.103 Under section 487.05(2) the 
justice must be satisfied that there is a person qualified to take the 
sample. Section 487.06 sets out the types of samples that may be taken 
and section 487.07 sets out the mandatory procedures required to be 
followed when executing the order. This includes providing the subject 
of the warrant with privacy and providing him or her with information 
about the warrant and process being executed. Section 487.08 sets out 
the use to which bodily samples and DNA profiles taken from that sample 
can be put, as well as creating an offence for a use not articulated in the 
provision. Section 487.09 sets out the circumstances under which samples 
taken pursuant to warrant and the profiles that result must be destroyed. 
There is no question that, other than Part VI of the Criminal Code,104 
no other provision in the Code is as demanding. This is likely owing to 
Parliament’s appreciation for the heightened privacy interest attached to 
bodily substances.105 Even so, in R. v. B. (S.A.),106 the appellant suggested 
that section 8 (and section 7) demanded more than the scheme required. 
For instance, the appellant said that a Hunter v. Southam107 reasonable 
grounds to believe threshold was insufficient. In rejecting this argument, 
Arbour J. noted that the “standard of ‘reasonable grounds’ is well 
recognized in the law and I see no reason to adopt a higher one in the 
case of DNA warrants”.108 
The appellant also maintained that investigative necessity, similar to 
section 186(1)(b), should be required before a DNA warrant issue. Justice 
Arbour, on behalf of the court, rejected this argument. She held that the 
legislative scheme that responded to R. v. Borden109 was sufficient to 
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meet all constitutional requirements. In doing so, she read the “best 
interests of the administration of justice” requirement within section 487.05 
as precluding a “judge from issuing a warrant where it is unnecessary 
to do so”.110 
IX. FIRST THERE WAS R. V. STILLMAN AND THEN THERE WERE 
IMPRESSION WARRANTS 
On two separate occasions, while he was detained in custody, teeth 
impressions were taken from Mr. Stillman without his consent. On the 
second occasion, the process took almost two hours. Justice Cory found 
that this constituted a significant section 8 (and section 7) Charter breach. 
He concluded that the seizure of “bodily samples [and impressions] was 
highly intrusive. It violated the sanctity of the body which is essential to 
the maintenance of human dignity. It was the ultimate invasion of the 
appellant’s privacy.”111 As such, the need for legislation was clear.112 
The same year R. v. Stillman113 was released, Parliament enacted 
what is now section 487.092, permitting a search warrant to issue for the 
seizure of a “handprint, fingerprint, footprint, foot impression, teeth 
impression or other print or impression of the body or any part of the 
body”, where a justice is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that an offence has been committed and that “information 
concerning the offence will be obtained by the print or impression”. The 
justice must be further satisfied that such a warrant will be in the “best 
interests of the administration of justice”. Pursuant to section 487.092(2), 
the justice shall impose terms and conditions considered “advisable” to 
ensure that the search and seizure authorized by the warrant is “reasonable 
in the circumstances”.114 
It is not clear what is meant by the “best interests of the administration 
of justice” consideration in this provision. Could it be like the DNA 
provision? We know it is not like the Part VI provision, judicially 
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defined in R. v. Finlay115 as reasonable grounds to believe, as it would be 
repetitious. Note that despite the strong Charter interests articulated in 
R. v. Stillman,116 a justice of the peace may issue an impression warrant. 
It is one thing to speak in terms of hand and footprints, but it is an 
entirely different constitutional question when authorizing the print or 
impression of a more private area of the body, as is permitted under the 
provision. This means that while a justice of the peace may authorize 
the taking of an impression of a highly private area of the body, he or 
she cannot authorize the taking of a bodily substance, that involves a 
comparatively minimally intrusive procedure.117 
X. ENOUGH DIALOGUE 
There has been a great deal written about Charter dialogue between 
the courts and legislatures. As noted by Binnie J. in Little Sisters Book 
and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), the court has 
“frequently recognized the importance of fostering a dialogue between 
courts and the legislatures”.118 The proliferation of search provisions in 
the Criminal Code,119 coinciding with the release or anticipated release 
of important section 8 judgments, is a testament to the fact that dialogue 
works.120 In the case of provisions providing for prior authorization, 
perhaps it is working too well. 
While dialogue between the courts and legislatures is generally 
considered a desirable result, it has led to somewhat of a knee-jerk 
reaction in the area of section 8.121 In striving to craft legislation that 
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responds to section 8 concerns articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
Parliament has introduced unnecessary complexity into the Criminal 
Code.122 Officers are forced to debate which section of the Code governs 
their proposed investigative technique and which legislative demands, 
including jurisdictional concerns, apply. Bearing in mind the observations 
of Dickson J. in Hunter v. Southam123 about the need for a contextual 
approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy, and the manner in which 
it can be overtaken, it would be naive to think that all of the complexities 
could be removed by providing for one simple “über provision”. While 
some provisions could be condensed into a single section, the reality is 
that fluctuating privacy thresholds do not permit a single overriding 
provision. In short, some of the complexities embedded in the Criminal 
Code are unavoidable. 
With that said, there is clearly room for improvement. What follows 
are only some limited suggestions about, at a minimum, tweaking the 
authorization provisions to allow for a more coherent and simpler 
approach.124 
XI. THERE HAS TO BE A BETTER WAY 
1. Move the Video-Warrant Provision to Where It Belongs 
R. v. Wong125 maintained that video surveillance is akin to other 
forms of electronic surveillance. It does not belong in Part XV of the 
Criminal Code.126 This is clear by virtue of the fact that Parliament had 
to adopt, by reference, among others, sections 183, 184.2, 185 and 186 
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of the Code. Barring a participant surveillance video, these are Crown 
agent applications. They are driven by considerations unique to Part VI 
of the Code. The jurisdiction to issue a video-warrant should reside in 
that Part of the Code. In fact, it should simply be merged into the pre-
existing provisions. Locating the video-warrant provision in Part VI 
would remove confusion in this area and ensure that the provision properly 
reflects the enhanced privacy interest recognized in Wong. 
2. “Best Interests of the Administration of Justice” 
This term introduces significant confusion into the Code. It is unclear 
what it means. The only thing we know for sure, as acknowledged by 
Martin J.A. in R. v. Finlay,127 is that it means different things in different 
contexts. This is really nothing more than an acknowledgment of basic 
section 8 principles, that an issuing justice must balance all interests 
concerned, including the state’s interest in law enforcement and the 
individual’s interest in privacy, when determining whether to issue 
process. If this is what it means, though, then is it not correct that each 
search provision in the Code should contain this constitutional requirement? 
Why only some? Is it only worth reminding justices and judges to engage 
in this required balance in some contexts? If this discretion is inextricably 
linked to the exercise of judicial discretion, then adding the words “best 
interests of the administration of justice” is redundant and adds confusion 
that is unnecessary and duplicitous. The confusion in this area could be 
resolved by removing this phraseology from the provisions altogether. 
The one exception is section 186(1)(a) of the Code. In R. v. Finlay,128 
“best interests of the administration of justice” was interpreted to mean 
“reasonable grounds to believe”. This provision should be amended by 
replacing the “best interests” language with the specific threshold test for 
issuance. 
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3. Make All Warrants and Judicial Authorizations Available for 
Past, Current and Future Offences 
Currently, there are a number of provisions that do not permit seizures 
or surveillance where an offence is anticipated to occur in the future. For 
instance, section 186(1)(a) of the Code, setting out the “best interests” 
test, has been judicially interpreted as reasonable grounds to believe an 
offence has been or is being committed. This stands in direct contrast to 
section 184.2 of the Code permitting a participant surveillance authorization 
in circumstances where there exist grounds to believe an offence will 
occur in the future. Section 487 of the Code does not accommodate 
tangible seizures in relation to offences anticipated to occur in the 
future. This stands in stark contrast with other warrant provisions, such 
as DNRs, tracking warrants and general warrants. In fact, the general 
warrant, section 487.01, is often used for tangible seizures, where an 
offence is anticipated in the future, because section 487 will not 
accommodate such a seizure. There is no constitutional reason supporting 
this distinction. It should be remedied by making all forms of prior 
judicial authorization available for anticipated offences.129 
4. Collapse the Search Provisions 
There is no reason that we need to have so many provisions dealing 
with prior authorization: regular warrants, general warrants, production 
orders, DNA warrants, tracking warrants, DNR orders, impression warrants 
and the like. Renee Pomerance suggested a collapse of sections 487, 487.01 
and 487.091 (now section 487.092).130 This makes good sense. I would 
add to this list the new production orders. The production scheme, sections 
487.011-487.017, was added to the Code in an effort to allow third parties 
to produce documents and information sought by the police, instead of 
the police searching for those items. The reality is that this ability already 
existed. In fact, until the production orders were enacted, sections 487 
and 487.01, with the use of an assistance order under section 487.02, 
were widely used to have innocent third parties, such as banks and 
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telecommunication companies, collect documents and information and 
provide it to the police under warrant.131 While there are certain helpful 
aspects to the production order scheme, such as the ability to require a 
person to whom the order is directed to “prepare a document based on 
documents or data already in existence and produce it”, there is no  
reason that this power could not be absorbed into the larger and more 
comprehensive warrant provision.132 
As a result of the lower constitutional threshold brought to bear on 
DNR and tracking warrants, it would be difficult to absorb them within 
a larger provision consolidating other search powers. At a minimum, 
though, they should be distilled into a single provision, allowing for any 
technique to be used to track a target and to gather DNR information. If 
these warrants were to be absorbed into the larger provision, it would be 
important to recognize the fluctuating threshold of grounds to suspect. 
DNA warrants should likely remain a free-standing warrant. This is 
owing to the fact that they reside within a complex and sophisticated 
legislative framework, creating powers and responsibilities in relation to 
the execution and post-execution phase of the warrant, including the state’s 
significant responsibilities respecting the DNA sample. It is difficult  
to imagine breaking these warrants off from the legislative scheme that 
bootstraps their constitutionality.133 As well, the DNA data bank provisions 
are inextricably linked to that legislative scheme. Severing off DNA 
warrants could result in confusion for the data bank provisions.134 
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5. Allow a Judge Issuing a Wiretap Authorization to Order Anything 
That Will Assist in Giving Effect to That Authorization 
Currently, wiretap authorizations are exceptionally complex. This 
is, in part, related to the fact that the issuing judge must make multiple 
orders to assist in giving effect to the authorization. By way of example, 
DNR orders always attach to a wiretap authorization as it is important to 
receive information about numbers dialled and received simultaneous to 
the interception of communications. As well, tracking warrants usually 
accompany a wiretap authorization, permitting vehicles that have a probe 
installed to be tracked simultaneously with communications being 
intercepted. General warrants and the like are also, often, part of the 
package. While an omnibus order often results from the application, it 
still requires the issuing judge to have regard to the specific legislative 
criteria attaching to each form of authorization. 
This should be simplified for purposes of Part VI of the Criminal 
Code.135 Any judge allowing for an authorization under Part VI should 
be granted the power, pursuant to that Part, to order anything that will 
assist in giving effect to the authorization. There are no constitutional 
concerns with such an approach, given that the strong requirements for a 
wiretap authorization must first be met before any ancillary activity may 
be ordered. This is a simple and practical manner in which to address 
these often complex and difficult judicial exercises. 
6. Allow a Superior Court Judge to Issue Any Warrant or 
Authorization 
Regardless of how many warrant provisions result from a consolidated 
approach, it is important that superior court judges be provided with the 
jurisdiction to grant all warrants and authorizations under the Code . 
Right now, the fact that a superior court judge cannot grant a DNA 
warrant, by way of example, is troublesome. It means that the same judge 
who grants a wiretap authorization which leads to sufficient grounds to get 
a DNA warrant, cannot issue the latter warrant. This leads to unacceptable 
inefficiencies and should be remedied. There is no constitutional reason 
for the exclusion of judges of the superior court. 
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XII. CONCLUSION 
A lot has happened in the last quarter-century. While scientific and 
technological aspects of investigations have taken off, section 8 of the 
Charter has taken root. This has had a rather profound impact on the 
Criminal Code136 and Parliament’s attempt to keep stride with the Court’s 
approach to privacy interests. Parliament cannot be faulted for enacting 
provisions to ensure that the police community has the tools available to 
it to advance important investigative work. Nonetheless, this approach 
has resulted in some unnecessary inconsistencies and complexities. It is 
important, at this quarter-century mark, to take stock and see how we 
can go forward in a more coherent manner. 
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